

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T GENEVA 04309

EXDIS

USSALT TWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS,
MARCH 16, 1978 (SALT TWO-1663)

1. (ROWNY/BELETSKY-STARODUBOV, A-2082)

NEW TYPES

BELETSKY SAID TODAY'S STATEMENT HAD EXPLAINED
RATIONALE FOR THEIR PROPOSAL IN COMPREHENSIVE FASHION. HE
COMPLAINED U.S. PAID ATTENTION ONLY TO ICBMS WHEREAS SLBMS
AND HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS AND CRUISE MISSILES
WERE EQUALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC EQUATION.
HE STRESSED TOTAL WARHEAD COUNT AND SAID HE COULD NOT
AGREE THAT SLBMS, HEAVY BOMBERS OR CRUISE MISSILES WERE
LESS DESTABILIZING THAN ICBMS.

2. (A. JOHNSON/BEKETOV-JOURAVLEV, A-2085)

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NEW TYPES

ASKED IF TYPHOON SSBN WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION,
BEKETOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS AND EXPLAINED THAT PROGRAMS
ON DRAWING BOARD COULD BE STOPPED, BUT ONCE "METAL WAS
BEING USED" PROBLEM WAS MORE DIFFICULT. ASKED IF SOVIET
STATEMENT THAT SS-N-17 DEPLOYMENT WAS NOT "ENVISAGED"

WAS INDICATION SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO BAN ALL NEW TYPES OF SLBMS FOR PERIOD OF PROTOCOL, WITH EXCEPTION FOR ONE NEW MIRVED SLBM, BEKETOV REPLIED THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD PLANS TO DEPLOY NEW SLBM WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE.

CRUISE MISSILES

BEKETOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE EXPLANATION OF COMMENT MADE BY WARNKE THAT, UNDER SOVIET DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, THERE WOULD BE A SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE WITH RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM. JOHNSON REPLIED HE UNDERSTOOD SOVIET SIDE REJECTED CONCEPT THAT GUIDANCE COULD BE CONSIDERATION IN DETERMINING CAPABILITY OF CRUISE MISSILE TO EFFECTIVELY ENGAGE TARGET AT GIVEN RANGE. BEKETOV AGREED. JOHNSON SAID UNDER SOVIET DEFINITION CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD APPARENTLY BE DETERMINED BY STRAIGHT LINE FLIGHT TO FUEL DEPLETION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT GUIDANCE CONSIDERATIONS WOULD PRECLUDE EFFECTIVELY ENGAGING TARGET AT SUCH MAXIMUM RANGE. ASKED IF SOVIETS HAD ANY CRUISE MISSILES WHICH COULD EXCEED 600 KM RANGE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEKETOV REPLIED THAT SOVIET SIDE DID NOT. BEKETOV SAID, "I WILL GO FURTHER" AND HEADED A SHEET OF PAPER WITH DESIGNATION "SS-N-3." HE EXPLAINED THAT "JANE'S" LISTED SS-N-3 MAXIMUM RANGE AT 300 NAUTICAL MILES OR 555 KM AND THAT MISSILE, IN FACT, HAD LESSER MAXIMUM RANGE, SECRET

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BECAUSE "JANE'S ALWAYS OVERESTIMATES." BEKETOV GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATED RANGE OF SS-N-3 ON-BOARD RADAR. HE SAID IF RADAR RANGE WERE ADDED TO MISSILE RANGE, TOTAL WOULD EXCEED 600 KM; HOWEVER, SUCH CONSIDERATION WAS NOT RELEVANT BECAUSE MISSILE WOULD HAVE EXHAUSTED ITS FUEL SUPPLY BEFORE IT EXCEEDED 555 KM AND WOULD "FALL INTO THE WATER." ASKED IF ANY SOVIET AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WOULD EXCEED 600 KM RANGE UNDER SOVIET DEFINITION, JOURAVLEV REPLIED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD NO SUCH CRUISE MISSILES. JOURAVLEV ADDED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD MANY CRUISE MISSILES AND IF RANGE OF THESE MISSILES WAS IN EXCESS OF 600 KM, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO 600 KM LIMITATION.

IN DISCUSSION OF U.S. CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION, BEKETOV AND JOURAVLEV PRESSED FOR NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF PERCENTAGE DELTA OR EXTENDED RANGE IN EXCESS OF 2500 KM WHICH WOULD INDICATE ADDITIONAL FUEL CAPACITY U.S. REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY ENGAGE TARGET UNDER U.S. DEFINITION. JOURAVLEV ASKED IF 10, 20, OR 200 PERCENT OR 3000 NAUTICAL MILES, AS EXAMPLES, WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. EARLE

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